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Value investing in a politically charged 
environment
Alan Thompson, CFA, provides some insight on how to assess political risk, 
and incorporate this into a value based approach to investing.
The post-Thatcher political consensus in the UK has broken 
down, and political risks are growing. Under the distant days of 
Tony Blair, political consensus supported EU membership, and 
both major parties appeared to reach an uneasy compromise, 
accepting Bank of England independence on monetary policy and 
a market-based economy.
The government’s role was confined to regulation and protecting 
vulnerable members of society. Fast forward to 2016, and the 
situation has changed markedly, with the UK set to leave the 
EU and the appointment of Jeremy Corbyn as leader of the 
Labour party, a former left-wing backbencher who voted 428 
times against the Labour governments of 1997 to 2010. Back 
too is the old politics of popularism, with the Conservative party 
introducing foreign worker lists and the Labour party promising 
nationalisation and the ever popular printing of money.
GLOBAL UNCERTAINTY
Political uncertainty has also increased globally with the star of 
The Apprentice, Donald Trump, becoming President-elect. The 
Trump win has installed the first President with no elected-
office experience since Herbert Hoover in 1928, highlighting 
the breakdown of trust between the governed and the political 
elite in the United States. Turning to Europe, politicians and the 
public alike appear increasingly fractured and unable to resolve 
migration from Syria, Muslim extremism, or to stand together 
in the face of a resurgent Russia. The bare-chested Bear is again 
strutting around Eastern Europe and the Middle East, sabre 
rattling with military exercises in Kaliningrad and cancelling 
weapons deals on the decommissioning of weapons grade 
plutonium with the US.
The ratcheting up of political uncertainty is undoubtedly 
concerning, and the world sadly appears more unstable than it 
did 20 years ago. But political risk is nothing new. The Julio-
Claudian dynasty debased the Roman currency as far back as 
27 BC, for example.
Indeed just taking the 20th century as an example, the UK 
went through two World Wars, marches by Moseley’s Black 
shirts, the 1926 general strike, the Suez Crisis, two oil price 
shocks and the Cuban Missile Crisis with the real risk that the 
Cold War could have turned “hot”. On this basis, the present 
level of political risks appears significantly lower than many 
of the challenges that our parents and grandparents endured. 
But taking the current situation and projecting that forward is 
fraught with difficulties. Would political scientists in the 1950s 
have forecast the collapse of Communism and reunification of 
Europe? Or would they have anticipated the continued spread 
of the Communist ideology, given the post-war electoral success 
of socialist governments in Western Europe, and the perceived 
technological superiority of Sputnik and the Soviet Missile 
programme? Recognising shortcomings and limitations of 
economic and political forecasts is a challenge for all analysts, 
as nothing can be gained through overconfidence except the 
prospect of financial losses.
THE POLITICAL RESEARCH CONUNDRUM
Eugene Fama’s efficient-market hypothesis (1965) argues 
that assessing political risk will not lead to superior returns 
for investors. Instead competition amongst traders will on 
average ensure that information is reflected in market prices, 
and although markets are not infallible, profit opportunities 
will be rare and fleeting. But if investors en masse adopt a free 
riding/a lazy man’s approach and shun research, it leads to a 
paradox of how a market can be efficient when it is suboptimum 
for any individual to engage in research (Grossman and 
Stiglitz, 1980). Free riding or acquiring information from the 
behaviour of others can also lead to information cascades, 
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whereby individuals observe the actions of others and blindly 
follow despite being in possession of evidence to the contrary 
(Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer, and Welch, 1992).
The formation of asset price bubbles directs investment into 
projects which are inefficient for society, and can prove costly for 
investors in the inevitable market correction. More positively, 
the formation of financial bubbles allows investors that conduct 
their own research and have the courage of their conviction and 
the possibility of outperforming in the longer term.
Frameworks for determining fundamental value require 
an explicit forecast of the political and economic environment. 
This central forecast has an almost zero percent probability 
of occurring, but is necessary as a building block for the 
determination of fundamental value. Feeding a forecast of the 
political and economic environment allows teams to compare 
investments across asset classes on a like-for-like basis. Having 
screened for assets which have a higher intrinsic value than the 
prevailing market price, an assessment of the accompanying 
uncertainty must be conducted which includes company 
fundamentals along with political and economic risks.
Political risk in democratic countries is assessed on the 
basis of the institutions and mechanisms of government. An 
individual politician can certainly behave rashly or without 
conducting sufficient research, but there are sufficient checks 
and balances, either explicitly or implicitly, in most democratic 
countries that there is only a limited discretion for any person. 
In the UK, the executive branch of government is held to 
account by: the House of Commons, House of Lords, an 
independent judiciary and an independent Bank of England, 
which along with Sir Humphrey’s civil service (the fictional 
character from the television show, Yes Prime Minster), and 
the underlying economic drivers constrain any hot headedness, 
while also allowing reform. These checks and balances are 
arguably why markets had little reaction to the surprise Trump 
victory, as reforms have increasingly required 60 votes in the 
Senate to prevent filibusters, and hence the 54 Republicans will 
have to co-operate across party lines.
The situation is, of course, markedly different in non-
democratic countries, without the constraints of power, and 
often missing the channels for dissenters to voice legitimate 
grievances. There, the investor needs a far higher expected 
return. History has shown that investing in dictatorships or 
countries with state-controlled capitalism has a higher level 
of uncertainty, with risks of expropriation, economic miss-
management, war, revolution or simply the ending of the 
rule of law. Russia and Zimbabwe are clear cases, whereas 
more pertinently the lack of political reform in China is a 
smouldering risk, and Turkey appears to be on the road to 
authoritarianism with the dismantling of pluralist institutions. 
But political risk also encompasses government regulations, 
which proliferate in every sector of the modern economy 
and generally dominate geopolitical risks at least in the 
developed world.
INVESTMENTS
Applying this investment process requires that investors are 
willing to “walk away” and seek out new opportunities when 
current prospects have insufficient margins of safety. But fund 
managers have only marginal amounts of discretion because 
of rigid fund mandates, short-term benchmarking, and the 
attractiveness of fee income to fund management businesses. For 
example, consider the investors who purchased the 50-year gilt on 
30th August 2016, which yielded just 1.1%. It’s difficult to believe 
that this is little more than a false market created by political risk/
pension regulation, and value-based investors would do best to 
avoid it. Demand is determined by pension legislation and the 
Bank of England’s quantitative easing programme, while supply 
is controlled by the Debt Management Office, an agency of the 
UK Treasury, which has combined to create an almost “herd like” 
run into long-dated gilts by defined benefit pension funds. The 
problem is that this is a suboptimum outcome for everyone, with 
companies facing ever larger pension contributions, and current 
employees are being forced onto money purchase schemes. 
Members of defined benefit schemes are arguably better off with 
a cash equivalent sum. The only party to gain from the current 
setup is the government, which is enjoying artificially lower 
borrowing rates and is reducing the power of markets to monitor 
fiscal discipline. Growing pension deficits across the corporate 
sector increases the likelihood of pension reform, and value 
investors should shun this market. The political risk from pension 
reform or higher inflation is far too high, and is not compensated 
by a suitable margin of safety.
Benjamin Graham applied a 'margin of safety' to his 
approach. Purchasing assets when their intrinsic value is 
substantially higher than their price limits the downside risk to 
investors of any purchase, and acknowledges the lack of perfect 
foresight with regard to both company fundamentals along with 
economic and political forecasts. n
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